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HEALTH CARE REGULATION: DILEMMA OF A
PARTIALLY DEVELOPED PUBLIC POLICY
KENNETH R. WING t
BURTON CRAIGE t
Significant government attempts to regulate or control health facil-
ities are remarkably recent phenomena. Except for state programs of
health facility licensure, I which have generally required only that facil-
ities meet minimal standards of quality and safety,2 and the incidental
planning activities associated with the Hill-Burton construction pro-
gram, 3 American health facilities have until recently been free from
any serious government efforts to regulate the quality of patient care,
affect the cost of services, or determine the allocation of resources. In
the past decade, however, the increasing concern of the general public
about the costs of health care4 and, more importantly, the concerns of
local, state, and federal governments about the impact of health care
t Assistant Professor of Public Health and Assistant Professor of Law, The University of
North Carolina. B.A. 1968, University of California at Santa Cruz; J.D. 1971, and M.P.H. 1972,
Harvard University. Professor Wing is also a consultant to the Assistant Secretary, Planning and
Evaluation, Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
t Candidate for J.D. 1980, The University of North Carolina; B.A. 1971, Harvard College;
M.P.H. 1974, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Project Director 1975-1976, Hot
Springs Health Program, Hot Springs, North Carolina.
1. See generally text accompanying notes 148-152 infra.
2. See A. SOMERS, HOSPITAL REGULATION: THE DILEMMA OF PUBLIC POLICY 118-32
(1969); Worthingham & Silver, Regulation of Quality of Care in Hospitals: The Needfor Change,
35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 305, 308 (1970).
3. See text accompanying notes 160-66 infra.
4. Estimates of the costs of health care in this country vary with the source of information
relied upon and with the definition of health care used. The most often cited and among the most
reliable statistics are those prepared by HEW and periodically published in SOCIAL SECURITY
BULLETIN.
The most recent HEW estimates of national health expenditures indicate that the nation
spent approximately $163 billion for health care in fiscal year 1977. See Gibson & Fisher, Na-
tional Health Expenditures, Fircal Year 1977, Soc. SEC. BULL., July 1978, at 3, 5 (Table 1). This
represents an increase of 12% over the spending for the previous year, and an increase from ap-
proximately 8.7% of the gross national product to 8.8%. Id at 3.
These figures indicate a continuation of an inflationary trend that has extended over the last
decade. Health care expenditures increased at an average annual rate of over 12% from 1965 to
1970, and have increased over 13% annually since 1970. Id at 5 (Table 1).
Recent estimates indicate that spending for fiscal year 1978 may exceed $180 billion and may
reach over $200 billion by 1980.
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costs on government budgets,' have created a political climate favoring
increases in public control of health care in general and health facilities
in particular.
Since 1964, thirty-eight states have attempted to regulate capital
expenditures by health facilities through "certificate of need" pro-
grams.6 Federal efforts to establish health resource planning programs,
originally billed as financial support for voluntary efforts, 7 have in-
creased and taken on a markedly regulatory character. The 1974 fed-
eral health planning legislation' provides financial support for an
elaborate scheme of state and local health planning agencies with the
authority to influence, and in some cases to determine, federal funding
decisions.9 The 1974 legislation also provides extensive authority to
regulate capital expenditures by health facilities and related institu-
tions.' 0 In addition, government reimbursement policies and the re-
quirements of participation under Medicaid and Medicare have been
used increasingly to influence facility costs," maintain the quality of
patient care,'2 and encourage, if not coerce, changes in the manner in
which care is delivered.'
3
That the Ninety-Fifth Congress, under the urging of the Carter
Administration, gave serious consideration to the imposition of
mandatory cost controls for the nation's hospitals' 4 demonstrates both
5. As the overall costs of health care have inflated, so have the costs of government health
care programs. Public spending for personal health services, primarily expenditures for the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs, exceeded $57.1 billion in 1977 and represented over 40% of all
spending for personal health care. Id at 7 (Table 3). Of this total, about $40 billion or 28% of the
total cost of health care came from federal programs, and about $17 billion or 12% came from
state and local government. Id at 7 (Table 3). This also is a continuation of an inflationary trend
that began in 1965, the year that the Medicare and Medicaid programs were enacted. Id at 5
(Table I).
While the federal share is larger, inflation in government health care programs has had a
serious impact on state and local governments as well. Federal health programs are now over 10%
of federal spending, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV'T:
FISCAL YEAR 1978, at 52; state expenditures for health average over 7% of state budgets, see
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 303 (Table 489) (1978).
6. See text accompanying notes 176-79 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 173-75 infra.
8. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-
300t (1976).
9. Id § 300l-2(e)(l)(A).
10. See id § 300m-2(a)(4)(A).
11. .See Wing & Silton, Constitutionalduthorityfor Extending Federal Control Over the Del/v-
ery of Health Care, this Symposium, at notes I 1 & 12 and accompanying text.
12. Id at text accompanying note 30.
13. See text accompanying notes 155-200 infra.
14. See Wing & Silton, this Symposium, at note 41.
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the emerging importance of the health care cost problem and the recent
dramatic change in the nation's political attitudes towards government
regulation of health care providers.
While concern about rising costs has resulted in a climate that is
favorable to regulation, it is not clear that regulation is the most appro-
priate response. Indeed, some experts argue that public policy should
be quite the opposite'5 and that government should intervene in the
health care industry only to the extent necessary to ensure that there is
an adequate level of competition among health care providers and that
market forces control cost. These free market theorists contend that
public regulation will only exacerbate inflation, stifle competition and
innovation, and result in a less rational distribution of facilities and
resources.
Whatever the merits of market solutions, both state and federal
governments have shown a preference for regulatory strategies. Until
those strategies prove to be unworkable, it is unlikely that there will be
a major shift in this policy. Quite to the contrary, current legislative
and administrative proposals do not involve choices between regulation
and (enforced) competition; the only consideration is whether to extend
regulation beyond current programs. There is still substantial political
support for maintenance of the basically private character of the health
care industry and, as the defeat of hospital cost containment demon-
strates, there are limits on our willingness to extend government con-
trol. 16 It is clear, however, that we have entered an era in which
government is seeking to extend its influence over health care delivery
by expanding the scope of existing controls and making existing regula-
tory mechanisms more effective.
It is, therefore, appropriate to examine existing regulatory controls
in an attempt to assess their successes and to reflect on the future of
public control. Before examining particular experiences with regula-
tion, however, it is necessary to look at the nature of the industry itself
and the history of government intervention. Critical evaluation of reg-
ulatory strategies is impossible without a basic understanding of the
affected institutions, the role they play in service delivery and their
15. Strong arguments have been made, in both public debate and in the literature, in favor of
an "antitrust" approach to controlling health care costs, and the current trend towards government
regulation is sometimes criticized as both ineffective and philosophically inappropriate. For a
collection of recent articles on this topic, see Symposium on the Antitrust Laws and the Health
Services Industry, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303. For a good summary of related references see Havighurst,
Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 304, 304 n. 1.
16. See Wing & Silton, this Symposium, at text accompanying notes 65-69.
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financial structure. Equally important is an understanding of the
historical context out of which the current regulatory efforts have
emerged and the peculiar character of the programs that have evolved.
I. THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
The American health care delivery system is composed of a variety
of public and private, individual and institutional actors, linked by
complex and rapidly changing financial and administrative arrange-
ments. t7 Regulatory efforts have been directed primarily at instilutional
providers of health services. Individual providers (physicians, pharma-
cists, dentists) have for the most part remained free from government
control.
Political considerations account for the relative immunity enjoyed
by individual providers. Well-organized associations of health profes-
sionals, traditionally dominated by conservative fee-for-service practi-
tioners, have drawn from a large reservoir of public trust, as well as
private finances, in their struggle to resist public control.I8 And while
opposition to regulation has been stronger among individual, as op-
posed to institutional, providers, the need for public intervention has
not seemed as urgent. As more (and more expensive) services are ren-
dered in institutional settings, individual providers are responsible for a
declining proportion of total health care costs. 9
This analysis will reflect current regulatory priorities and concen-
trate on institutional providers, specifically hospitals and nursing
homes. Together, these institutions account for half of the total health-
related expenditures.20 During the past fifteen years hospitals and
nursing homes have experienced spectacular growth and have increas-
17. See generally HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES (S. Jonas ed. 1977); F.
WILSON & D. NEUHAUSER, HEALTH SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1976).
18. R. ALFORD, HEALTH CARE POLITICS: IDEOLOGICAL AND INTEREST GROUP BARRIERS TO
REFORM (1975); R. HARRIS, A SACRED TRUST (1966); E. RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND
AMERICAN MEDICINE (1967); Comment, The American MedicalAssociation: Power, Purpose, and
Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 937 (1954).
19. See text accompanying notes 41-43 infra (noting decline in proportionate expenditures
for physicians' services). Dentists and pharmacists also receive a smaller share of health expendi-
tures than they once did. The proportion of total health expenditures for dental services declined
from 13.3% in 1929 to 6.2% in 1977; expenditures for drugs consumed 16.7% of the total in 1929
and only 7.7% in 1977. Gibson & Fisher, supra note 4, at 15 (Table 5).
20. In the fiscal year ending September 1977, expenditures for hospital care totalled $65.6
billion. Nursing home care expenditures were $12.6 billion. These figures represented 40.4% and
7.8%, respectively, of total national health expenditures. An additional 3.1% ($5.1 billion) was
spent on medical facilities construction, much of it for hospitals and nursing homes. Gibson &
Fisher, supra note 4, at 15 (Table 5).
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ingly become the objects of critical public attention. Discussions of
regulation, however, all too often ignore the variety of forces and actors
within the regulated sector. An overview of the development, structure
and dynamics of the hospital and nursing home industries will at least
suggest the complexity of the regulatory task.
A. Hospitals
Ten years ago an astute observer wrote,
The hospital is to modem America what the cathedral was to Europe
in the Middle Ages: a complex social institution serving simultane-
ously a variety of purposes-welfare center, object of civic pride, ma-
jor source of employment, market for artists, artisans, and architects,
inspirer of saintly deeds and beneficiary of repentant sinners, occa-
sional "cover-up" for hypocrites and exploiters, source of power, and
object of political conflict.2 '
In the last decade the hospital has assumed even greater importance.
Provider of a growing array of services, consumer of an increasing pro-
portion of resources, it has solidified its dominant position in the Amer-
ican health care system. At the same time, it has become the focus of
ever more intensive scrutiny and criticism. As the belief in technologi-
cal salvation declines, its institutional embodiment, the hospital, can no
longer depend on the veneration of the faithful to protect it from public
control.
Only relatively recently have hospitals been identified with medi-
cal cure for the acutely ill. The medieval hospital, operated by the
Church, provided a refuge for the poor, the aged, the homeless and the
sick. Its purpose was more philanthropic and spiritual than medical.22
In the sixteenth century, the hospital was secularized and subjected to
governmental authority.3 While its mission was reformulated in social
terms, it retained its character as a shelter for the unfortunate, with
only an incidental medical function.
24
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, English and
American hospitals began to assume more specialized roles. Private
"voluntary" hospitals, financed by subscription and bequest, arose to
21. A. SOMERS, supra note 2, at ix.
22. Rosen, The Hospitak Historical Sociqlogy a/a Community Institution, in THE HOSPITAL
IN MODERN SOCIETY 1, 2-13 (E. Freidson ed. 1963).
23. See id at 13-19.
24. In 1551 a council of citizens set admissions quotas for St. Thomas' Hospital in London:
300 orphans, 400 aged, 650 "decayed householders," 200 idle vagabonds, 350 "poor men
overburdened with children" and 20 "sore and sick persons." J. FREYMANN, THE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: ITS GENESIS AND TRAJECTORY 21-22 (1974).
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supplement and supplant the public institutions. The voluntary hospi-
tal provided care for patients who had some prospect of recovery. The
incurables, the insane, the blind and those with infectious diseases were
sent to public almshouses.25
The early hospitals, both public and private, catered almost exclu-
sively to the poor. Patients with adequate means were treated by their
physician at home. The abysmal hygienic conditions, the overcrowding
of the wards and the primitive state of medical knowledge made the
hospital the choice of only the most desperate.26
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, scientific advances
transformed the institution. Surgical anesthesia and asepsis, new diag-
nostic and therapeutic techniques, and improved standards of general
hygiene reduced hospital mortality rates. In 1900 a patient admitted to
a general hospital had for the first time a better than even chance of
leaving alive.27 The public began to view the institution as a place of
hope rather than despair. The rate of growth was astonishing: in 1873
there were only an estimated 178 hospitals in the United States; by
1909 there were 4,359.2S
Although hospitals proliferated in the early part of this century,
the solo medical practitioner remained the dominant actor in the health
care system.29 It was only after World War II that several forces con-
verged to effect another fundamental change in the institution and to
shift the balance of power from the private physician to the modem
hospital industry.30 Rapid advances in medical knowledge and tech-
nology caused patient care to become more fragmented and costly.
3 1
Physicians increasingly relied on hospital facilities and resources to
supplement their own services.32 The growth of Blue Cross plans33 and
the postwar boom in commercial health insurance,34 typically covering
25. Id at 22-24; Rosen, supra note 22, at 24-25.
26. Rosen, supra note 22, at 26, 29-30.
27. Enright & Jonas, Hospitals, in HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 164, 166
(S. Jonas ed. 1977).
28. Id (citing R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 52 (1971)).
29. B. EHRENREICH & J. EHRENREICH, THE AMERICAN HEALTH EMPIRE: POWER, PROFITS,
AND POLITICS 30 (1970).
30. Id at 30-33.
3 1. Knowles, The Hospital, SCIENTIFIC AM., Sept. 1973, at 128, 130-32. See generally S. REI-
SER, MEDICINE AND THE REIGN OF TECHNOLOGY (1978).
32. Knowles, supra note 31, at 130.
33. S. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 6-11 (2d ed. 1976); H. SOMERS & A.
SOMERS, DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND HEALTH INSURANCE 252 (1961).
34. HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 1977-78,
at 8, 23 (1978).
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only inpatient services, 35 accelerated the displacement of the solo prac-
titioner and, along with Hill-Burton construction funds,36 provided a
solid financial base for hospital expansion.37 The enactment of Medi-
care38 and Medicaid39 in 1965 fueled a second round of growth and
consolidated the dominance of the larger hospitals.4 0
Statistics reflect the hospital industry's ascendancy in the health
care sector. In 1929 expenditures for hospital care41 comprised 19.2%
of all national expenditures for health services and supplies. By 1977
the figure had risen to 42.6%. During the same period, the proportion
of expenditures paid for physicians' services declined from 27.7% to
19.8%.42 Hospitals are also consuming an increasing proportion of gov-
ernment spending for health care. Their share of public expenditures
climbed from 48.4% in 1965 to 57.8% in 1977.43
Expenditures for health services only partially reflect the modem
hospital's preeminence. While the hospital's primary function is still
the provision of personal medical care, its role has become much
broader. Most medical students, interns, and residents, as well as many
other health professionals, are trained exclusively in hospitals.' The
35. Id at 21; see H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, supra note 33, at 250 (explanation of enrollment
categories).
36. See text accompanying notes 160-66 infra.
37. The number of community hospitals grew from 4444 in 1946 to 5736 in 1965, and bed
supply increased from 473,000 to 741,000. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATIS-
TICS: 1978, at 5 (Table 1) (1978). For a definition of "community hospital," see text accompany-
ing note 49 infra.
38. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified in
scattered sections of 26, 42, 45 U.S.C.). For an early appraisal of the legislation's impact, see H.
SOMERS & A. SOMERS, MEDICARE AND THE HOSPITALS (1967).
39. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 1901-05, 79 Stat. 343 (1965)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976)). For a good early analysis, see Stevens & Stevens, Medicaid-
Anatomy ofa Dilemma, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 348 (1970).
40. B. EHRENREICH & J. EHRENREICH, supra note 29, at 37-39.
Although the number of community hospitals has grown only slightly since 1965, the number
of beds has increased by 31%. Small hospitals have experienced an absolute and relative decline.
The number of community hospitals with less than 100 beds dropped from 3489 in 1965 to 2833 in
1977. During the same period the number with more than 400 beds increased from 292 to 554.
These large institutions accounted for about one-fourth (25.2%) of all community hospital beds in
1965 compared to about one-third (33.2%) in 1977. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra
note 37, at vii-viii (Text Table 5, Text Table 6) (1977 figures); AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION,
HOSPITAL STATISTICS: 1977, at vii-viii (Text Table 3, Text Table 4) (1977) (1965 figures).
41. "Hospital care" expenditures cover all spending for both inpatient and outpatient care,
including all services by hospital staff (including physicians salaried by the hospital) and the
purchase of drugs and other supplies. Self-employed physicians' services in hospitals (those of
surgeons, for example) are not included. Gibson & Fisher, supra note 4, at 17-18.
42. See id at 15 (Table 5).
43. See id at 11 (Table 4) (1977 figures); Hanft, NationalHealth Expenditures, 1950-65, Soc.
SEC. BULL., Feb. 1967, at 3, 4 (1965 figures).
44. For a critique of the close relationship between the teaching hospital and the medical
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hospital is also the site of continuing medical education programs. 45 At
the major medical centers a large portion of institutional resources are
devoted to medical research.46 Finally, some hospitals have attempted
to extend their reach into the community by establishing satellite health
centers and programs of community health education.47 While not all
these services are produced solely by the hospital, the hospital is unique
in that "there exist no services which are not produced within, or under
its institutional aegis."48
1. Variation Among Hospitals
The hospital industry is composed of an enormous variety of insti-
tutions. The long-term psychiatric hospital and the college infirmary,
the decaying municipal institution and the suburban proprietary facil-
ity, the huge medical school complex and the fifty-bed rural outpost:
all share a common label. In an effort to define the most important
part of the industry more specifically, the American Hospital Associa-
tion has developed a hybrid descriptor, the "community hospital." Al-
though the term excludes long-term and federal hospitals, as well as
hospital units of institutions such as prisons and college infirmaries,4 9 it
still encompasses more than 80% of all hospitals50 and tends to mask
important differences among them. The usefulness of the definition is
thus limited by its breadth.
From 1967 to 1977, the average number of beds per community
hospital increased from 135 to 165.11 Yet the industry continues to be
characterized by small institutions. In 1977 close to one-half of all
community hospitals had less than 100 beds.5 2 Yet most health econo-
mists believe that substantial economies of scale are associated with
larger hospital size, at least up to about 200 beds.53 From the
school, see Ebert, MedicalEducation in the United States, in DOING BETrER AND FEELING WORSE
171 (J. Knowles ed. 1977).
45. See Gaintner, Continuing Medical Education in the Community Hospital, 51 BULL. N.Y.
ACAD. MED. 739 (1975); Steams, Positive Approaches to Continuing Medical Education in Commu.
nity Hospitals, 277 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 1341 (1967).
46. Glaser, The Teaching Hospital and the Medical School, in THE TEACHING HOSPITAL 7, 27
(J. Knowles ed. 1966).
47. Knowles, supra note 31, at 136.
48. S. BERKI, HOSPITAL ECONOMICS, at xviii (1972).
49. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 37, at xxii.
50. Id at 4, 7 (Table 1).
51. Id at vii.
52. Id This group is gradually shrinking. See note 40 supra.
53. See, e.g., V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 82
(1974).
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standpoint of economic efficiency, it seems impossible to justify the
continued existence of so many small hospitals. 4
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the small, typically rural,
hospital lies the "teaching hospital," site of undergraduate and gradu-
ate training for physicians." While only comprising 13.1% of all com-
munity hospitals, teaching hospitals account for a disproportionate,
and increasing, share of beds, admissions and outpatient visits.56
Drawing prestige and resources from the medical schools with which
they are affiliated, teaching hospitals exert a large influence on the rest
of the hospital industry. 7
Seventy percent of community hospitals are privately owned.58 In
accord with the hospital's religious and philanthropic origins, more
than four-fifths of these private institutions are operated on a nonprofit
basis.59 Investor-owned, for-profit institutions constitute a small, but
growing portion of the industry.6" The rapid expansion of proprietary
hospital chains in the 1970s has inspired considerable controversy.
Some see proprietaries as a source of healthy competition; others per-
ceive a grave threat to the hospital's community service mission.6'
The remaining community hospitals are owned and operated by
state and local governments. Many urban public hospitals are beset
with serious financial difficulties. Serving a large proportion of indi-
gent patients, inadequately reimbursed by third-party payors, and
54. Id at 82-84. This is particularly true of hospitals in urban areas. Fuchs estimates that in
1973 there were more than 1000 metropolitan hospitals with less than 200 beds. Id
55. See Enright & Jonas, supra note 27, at 168, 170.
56. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 37, at 20 (Table 5A), 186 (Table 10A). In
1977 community hospitals affiliated with medical schools accounted for 35.0% of community hos-
pital beds, 34.3% of admissions, and 45.7% of outpatient visits. The average affiliated hospital had
439 beds, compared with 123 for nonaffiliated hospitals. Id at 180 (Table 8), 20 (Table 5A). For
a view of the rapid rate of growth of teaching hospitals compare these figures to 1972 data. AMER-
ICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS: 1972, at 34, 190 (Table 5, Table 9) (1973).
57. See generally Glaser, supra note 46.
58. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 37, at 20 (Table 5A).
59. Id On voluntary hospitals generally, see A. SOMERS, supra note 2.
60. Between 1972 and 1977, the share of community hospital beds held by proprietary hospi-
tals increased from 6.5% to 8.3%. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 37, at 20
(Table 5A) (1977 figures); AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS: 1972, at 4
(Table 5) (1973) (1972 figures).
61. For a good early discussion of the issues, see Steinwald & Neuhauser, The Role ofthe
Proprietary Hospital, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 817 (1970). For an early critical view, see A.
SOMERS, supra note 2, at 198-200. Proprietary hospital chains have been the subject of several
recent journalistic reports. See, e.g., Miller, Dyingfor Dollars, 6 SOUTHERN EXPOSURE, Feb. 1978,
at 105, 107-09; Shabecoff, (N.Y. Times News Service), For-Profit Hospitals Growing Fast Despite
Public, Medical Criticism, News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 17, 1978, at I, col. 4;
Shabecoff (N.Y. Times News Service), Private Hospital Chain Is Proving Successful, News and
Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 18, 1978, at 10, col. 1.
19791 1173
NORTH CAROLINA LAWREVIEW
victims of municipal fiscal crises, they are engaged in a constant strug-
gle for survival.62 Surprisingly, the great majority of public hospitals
are rural; in their clientele, staffmg and financial position, they do not
differ significantly from other rural community hospitals.63
Hospital characteristics vary significantly by region. As one might
expect, hospitals are largest in the urban Middle Atlantic States and
smallest in the predominantly rural Mountain States." Proprietary
hospitals are concentrated in the Pacific and Southern regions; they are
of only negligible importance in the New England and North Central
States.65 Public institutions account for about one-third of community
hospital beds in the Southern States; in the Northeast, the figure is only
about 10%.66
In recent years per capita hospital expenditures in the Northeast
have exceeded those in the South by 50% and those in the West by
30%.6 7 Differences in labor costs account for most of the disparity be-
tween the Northeast and the South, but cannot explain the Northeast-
West differential. Hospital utilization appears to be the critical distin-
guishing factor: the entire gap in per capita expenditures between
Northeast and West can be traced to the difference in length of stay.68
A person admitted to a community hospital in the State of Washington
can expect to be out in 5.5 days, but his or her cousin in New York can
look forward to a stay of 9.8 days.6 9 Only a small part of the gap is
caused by differences in age composition of the population: at given
62. HOSPITAL RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST, THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC-GEN-
ERAL HOSPITAL 6-7 (1978). For a guardedly optimistic view, see Craig & Koleda, The Urban
Fiscal Crisis in the United States, National Health Insurance, and Municipal Hospitals, 8 INT'L J.
HEALTH SERVICES 329 (1978). See generaly Dumbaugh, Bentkover & Newhauser, Public Hospi-
tals: An Evaluation, in HEALTH SERVICES: THE LOCAL PERSPECTIVE 148 (A. Levin ed. 1977).
63. HOSPITAL RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST, supra note 62, at 7-8. See generally M.
ROEMER, RURAL HEALTH CARE 77-79 (1976).
64. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 37, at 22-39 (Table 5B). In 1977
community hospitals in the Mountain States averaged 107 beds; the average in the Middle Atlan-
tic States was 260.
65. Id At the upper extreme, 18.7% of community hospital beds in the West South Central
States were in proprietary institutions in 1977. The comparable figure was only 0.6% in the East
North Central States.
66. Id In the subregions, the range was from 38% (East South Central) to 5.3% (New Eng-
land). Id
67. V. FUCHS, supra note 53, at 89. In 1977 per capita community hospital expenditures in
the Northeast were 39.3% higher than in the South and 21.6% higher than in the West. Thus the
gap has narrowed since Fuchs wrote in 1974. These figures are derived from AMERICAN HOSPI-
TAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 37, at 152-71 (Table 6), and 1977 population estimates by the Cen-
sus Bureau, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 14 (1978).
68. V. FUCHS, supra note 53, at 89.
69. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 37, at 104, 134 (Table 5C).
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ages and for given diagnoses, stays are significantly shorter in the
West.7° The regional variations in length of stay, without any associ-
ated difference in health outcomes, suggest that hospital services are
frequently overutilized.7'
2. Rise in Hospital Costs
Hospitals are an extraordinarily diverse breed. One characteristic,
however, seems common to all: costs are rising at an alarming rate. In
1950 Americans spent $3.7 billion for hospital care or about $24 per
capita. In 1977 the aggregate reached $65.6 billion and per capita ex-
penditures climbed to $297.72 During this twenty-eight year period, ex-
penditures for hospital care grew more than two and one half times as
fast as the Gross National Product.7 3 Since 1965, the annual rate of
increase has averaged a staggering 14.3%. 4
A small but significant portion of the increase in per capita ex-
penditures can be attributed to increased rates of hospital use.75 A
much greater part- close to ninety percent-is the result of the rise in
the average daily cost of hospital care.76 The average cost per patient
day in community hospitals increased from $15.62 in 1950 to $48.15 in
70. V. FUCHS, supra note 53, at 89.
71. For a discussion of the forces that encourage overutilization, see notes 81-92, 103 and
accompanying text infra.
It is not clear why the average length of stay is so much shorter in the West. It cannot be said
that overutilization has been discouraged by more rational capital investment; community hospi-
tals in the Pacific States have the lowest occupancy rate in the nation. AMERICAN HOSPITAL AssO-
CIATION, supra note 37, at 22-39 (Table 5B). A more plausible explanation is the prevalence of
prepaid group practices. Physicians working for health maintenance organizations (HMOs), in
contrast with fee-for-service practitioners, have every incentive to make a patient's hospital stay as
expeditious as possible. See generally Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Mar-
ketfor Health Services, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 716, 720-22 (1970). For a discussion of data
comparing hospital utilization among matched HMO and fee-for-service populations, see W. Mc-
CLURE, REDUCING ExcEss HOSPITAL CAPACITY 22-23 (DHEW Pub. No. HRP-0015199, Oct.
1976).
72. See Gibson & Fisher, supra note 4, at 6 (Table 2), 15 (Table 5).
73. See id at 14 (Chart 2), 15 (Table 5).
74. See id at 15 (Table 5).
75. The number of patient-days in short-term hospitals rose from .855 per capita in 1950 to
1.21 per capita in 1975, an annual rate of increase of 1.2%. COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STA-
BILITY, THE RAPID RISE OF HOSPITAL COSTS 4 & n.1 (Staff Report 1977) [hereinafter cited as THE
RAPID RIsE OF HOSPITAL COSTS].
76. Id Two different measures of the daily cost of hospital care are commonly used: (1) the
Bureau of Labor Statistics' Index of Hospital Service Charges (IHSC); and (2) the American Hos-
pital Association's Average Cost Per Patient Day (ACPPD). The IHSC attempts to measure the
changing price of afired bundle of common hospital services. The ACPPD, calculated by divid-
ing total hospital operating expenses by the number of inpatient days of care provided, reflects the
changing mix and volume of services as well as changes in the price of each type of service. The
ACPPD is the more appropriate indicator of the total increase in hospital cost. Id at 5-6.
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1966 and $175.08 in 1976.77 Inflation in the general economy accounts
for less than half of the increase. Measured in constant dollars, the
average cost per day increased fivefold from 1950 to 1976.78
While the seriousness of hospital cost inflation is generally ac-
knowledged, little consensus exists on the underlying causes.79 At least
eight contributing factors are widely cited in the literature: (1) insur-
ance coverage; (2) cost-based reimbursement; (3) excess capacity; (4)
labor costs; (5) technological advances; (6) the expanding role of the
community hospital; (7) physician control of demand; and (8) lack of
competition among providers. The choice of an appropriate cost con-
tainment strategy largely depends on which inflationary factors are
seen as most important-and which are most amenable to government
intervention.
a. Insurance coverage
Evidence strongly suggests that increases in insurance coverage,
coupled with rising incomes, have played a major part in hospital cost
inflation. 0 Private insurance coverage grew rapidly from 1950 until
the mid-1960s and then more moderately in the ensuing decade; public
financing of hospital care has mushroomed since the advent of Medi-
care and Medicaid in 1966. As a result of these developments, consum-
ers are now largely insulated from the cost of hospital care at the time
of illness. In 1950, 50% of community hospital costs were covered by
out-of-pocket patient payments. By 1975, the figure had dropped to
12% with public and private insurance splitting the remainder.' While
the average cost per patient day rose by a factor of ten from 1950 to
77. See id at 7 (Table 1). These figures include outpatient costs and thus overstate the cost of
an inpatient day. An adjusted index, developed by the AHA in 1963, excludes outpatient costs
and is about 12% lower than the unadjusted index. The less sensitive indicator has been used in
order to allow pre-1963 comparisons. The two indices have risen at very similar rates since 1963.
Id at 5 n.2.
78. See id at 8.
79. For discussions of different theories of hospital cost inflation, see OFFICE OF RESEARCH
AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, REPORT No. 41, COMMUNITY HOSPITALS:
INFLATION IN THE PRE-MEDICARE PERIOD (1972) [hereinafter cited as COMMUNITY HOSPITALS];
Davis, Rising Hospital Costs: Possible Causes and Cures, 48 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 1354 (1972);
McCarthy, Supply and Demand and Hospital Cost Inflation, 33 MED. CARE REV. 923 (1976).
80. See THE RAPID RISE OF HOSPITAL COSTS, supra note 75, at 29-38; M. FELDSTEIN, THE
RISING COST OF HEALTH CARE (1971). Feldstein's views have been corroborated by other re-
searchers. McCarthy, supra note 79, at 940-44. See, e.g., Davis, Hospital Costs and the Medicare
Program, SOC. SEC. BULL., Aug. 1973, at 18. See also COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY,
THE COMPLEX PUZZLE OF RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS: CAN THE PRIVATE SECTOR FIT IT To-
GETHER? 83-88 (1976) [hereinafter cited as THE COMPLEX PUZZLE].
81. THE RAPID RISE OF HOSPITAL COSTS, supra note 75, at 31 (Table 8).
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1975, the out-of-pocket cost of care, excluding third-party payments,
experienced a much more modest increase. Relative to the cost of all
other goods and services, the overall net cost of hospital care to the
consumer has remained virtually unchanged since 195 0 .12 With con-
stant out-of-pocket costs, and increasing disposable income, patients
demand more services and higher quality care. As explained in a re-
cent staff report of the Council on Wage and Price Stability, "Hospitals
respond by raising their cost per patient day and using the extra reve-
nue to provide a more expensive style of care. This change in the ap-
parent quality of care further increases demand, setting off another
round of price and quality increases." 3 In order to protect themselves
from the increasing costs of hospitalization, consumers purchase more
insurance, refueling the cycle.
b. Cost-based reimbursement
Instead of focusing on the extensiveness of third-party coverage,
some economists have stressed the nature of third-party reimburse-
ment. Many public and private health insurance plans, covering a
large majority of hospital services, reimburse institutional providers on
the basis of costs.8 4 The inflationary impact is obvious; since increased
costs are simply passed on to third-party payors, hospitals have little
incentive to restrain capital expenditures or to operate efficiently."5
c. Excess capacity
It has now become clear that excessive investment in hospital
equipment and facilities is a major inflationary factor.8 6 Trustees, phy-
sicians and administrators, particularly in nonprofit institutions, are
82. See id at 33-34.
83. Id at 36 (footnote omitted).
84. Klarman, Approaches to Moderating the Increases in Medical Care Costs, 7 MED. CARE
175, 185 (1969). Cost-based reimbursement was already widespread before Medicare: services for
more than three-fourths of Blue Cross enrollees were reimbursed at cost. Yet cost-based reim-
bursement was not the dominant mode until Medicare increased the number of patient days reim-
bursed at cost by more than 75%. Id See also THE COMPLEX PUZZLE, supra note 80, at 11-13, 86.
85. Empirical studies that have tested the cost-reimbursement hypothesis are evaluated in
McCarthy, supra note 79, at 933-35.
For an excellent analysis of the failure of private insurers to restrain costs, see Havighurst,
Controlling Health Care Costs: Strengthening the Private Sector's Hand, 1 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 471, 474-82 (1977). The intimate ties between the hospital industry and Blue Cross are
analyzed in S. LAW, supra note 33.
86. See W. MCCLURE, supra note 71. See also B. ENSMINGER, THE $8 BILLION HOSPITAL
BED OVERRUN (1975); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONTROL-
LING THE SUPPLY OF HOSPITAL BEDS (1976); Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Serv-
ices by "Cert/fcate of Need," 59 VA. L. REV. 1143, 1156-59 (1973).
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often more interested in prestigious additions than inexpensive patient
care.8 7 Unwarranted expansion of hospital bed capacity and unneces-
sary equipment purchases result in higher fixed costs, which are even-
tually borne by consumers in the form of increased service charges and
88insurance premiums.
Given current rates of hospital use, it is estimated that 5 to 10% of
the existing beds could be eliminated with no adverse effects on
health.89 Moreover, considerable evidence indicates that present rates
of use are excessive. Great international, regional and small area vari-
ations in per capita rates of hospital use cannot be explained by any
known health risk factors and are not associated with any ascertainable
differences in health outcomes.90 As Roemer and Shain first demon-
strated, excess capacity itself appears to induce overutilization. 9t Phy-
sicians, paid on a fee-for-service basis, and hospital administrators,
conscious of high fixed costs, share a common interest in keeping beds
filled.92
d Labor costs
Other students of hospital cost inflation have emphasized the rapid
increase in labor costs. Since 1955, hospital wages have risen faster
than earnings in other parts of the economy.93 Part of the differential
in the rate of increase in the early years may reflect a "catching up" of
wages for workers who have traditionally been underpaid. 94 Unioniza-
tion, a tight labor market in the mid-1960s and a change in the
skill-mix of hospital employees have also been cited as explanatory
87. Bovbjerg, Problems and Prospects for Health Planning: The Importance of Incentives,
Standards, and Procedures in Certificate of Need, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 83, 85; Havighurst, spra
note 86, at 1160-63. See generally B. ENSMINGER, supra note 86, at 42-43.
88. See Havighurst, supra note 86, at 1157.
89. W. MCCLURE, supra note 71, at 19-20.
90. Id at 22-27.
91. Shain & Roemer, Hospital Costs Relate to the Supply of Beds, MOD. HOSPITAL, April
1959, at 71. See Klarman, supra note 84, at 177-79. McClure offers a rough estimate of the
strength of the relationship: holding other factors constant, a 10% increase in beds per 1000 per-
sons is associated with a 4% rise in patient days per 1000 persons. W. MCCLURE, supra note 71, at
15.
92. Bovbjerg, supra note 87, at 87; Havighurst, supra note 86, at 1158.
93. THE RAPID RISE OF HOSPITAL COSTS, supra note 75, at 13.
94. Id at 56-57. According to a 1977 staff report of the Council on Wage and Price Stability,
hospital workers achieved parity with employees in the same occupations in other industries by
the early 1970s. Since then, however, hospital wages have continued to rise more rapidly than
wages in other industries. Id at 39-63. The report identified the rise in hospital employment, the
use of "relative wage scales," the role of hospital unions and "philanthropic wage setting" as
possible inflationary factors. Id at 62, 64-65.
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factors.95 Regardless of the reason for the rapid rate of increase in
wages, its impact on hospital cost inflation is relatively insignificant,
accounting for only about one-fourth of the increase of hospital costs in
excess of the general rise in consumer prices.96 Moreover, labor costs
have not increased as fast as expenditures for other inputs. The payroll
component of the community hospital budget has declined from 62% in
1965 to 51% in 1977.97
e. Technological advances
There is no doubt that increasingly sophisticated medical technol-
ogy has raised the cost of hospital care. CT scanners, intensive care
units, kidney dialysis facilities, heart-lung machines and other expen-
sive diagnostic and therapeutic modalities have proliferated with aston-
ishing rapidity.98 Even if the enormous capital and operating costs
simply represent the price we must pay for modem high-quality care,
the duplication of expensive, underutilized facilities in neighboring
hospitals cannot be justified.99
f The expanding role of community hospitals
Part of the rise in hospital expenditures can be attributed to the
expanded scope of hospital services." 0 Community hospitals have as-
sumed some of the roles traditionally filled by other providers. For
example, hospital emergency rooms become increasingly important as
private physicians restrict their practices to daytime office visits. Simi-
larly, the growth of psychiatric inpatient and outpatient services in
short-term hospitals is associated with the decline of mental
hospitals.101
95. Davis, supra note 79, at 1357 (citing, but not endorsing, these explanations). Elsewhere,
Davis does suggest that there was a slight shift toward more highly skilled personnel from 1960 to
1966. COMMUNITY HOSPITALS, supra note 79, at 31. But see THE RAPID RISE OF HOSPITAL
COSTS, supra note 75, at 43-46 (evidence of a decline in the skill-mix).
96. THE RAPID RISE OF HOSPITAL COSTS, supra note 75, at 13.
97. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 37, at x (Text Table 11) (1977 figures);
AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS: 1977, at xiii (1965 figures).
98. See Banta & Sanes, How the CAT Got Out of the Bag, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE QUALI-
TY OF HEALTH CARE 175 (R. Egdahl & P. Gertman eds. 1978) (CT scanner phenomenon);
Knowles, supra note 31.
99. See THE COMPLEX PUZZLE, supra note 80, at 9, 87-88; W. MCCLURE, supra note 71, at
21.
100. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 79, at 1364-65 (noting increase in use of hospital outpatient
services).
101. Id at 1359.
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g. Physician control of demand
The physician-patient relationship is characterized by a gross dis-
parity in power and knowledge.'0 2 The control exercised by the physi-
cian contributes to the escalation of health care costs in general, and
hospital costs in particular. Consumers of health services are unable to
make informed, independent decisions based on price and quality. The
choice of hospitalization and hospital, laboratory tests, prescription
drugs, surgical procedures and length of stay remain in the physician's
hands. The patient rarely dares to question decisions made on his be-
half. It is widely suspected that physician-directed demand results in
excessive use of services."0 3 At the least, it results in use that is insensi-
tive to price.
h. Lack of competition among providers
Patients in rural areas have little choice of hospitals or physi-
cians.tO Even in large cities, a patient is typically restricted to the insti-
tutions where his or her physician has staff privileges. 05 Limitations
on advertising, enforced by medical societies and sometimes by state
law, inhibit the patient's choice of physician.'0 6 Furthermore, physi-
cians exercise monopoly power by limiting entry into the profes-
sion 107and controlling the delegation of tasks to other health
workers.' 08 Cost-effective innovations in the delivery and financing of
102. McCarthy, Financingfor Health Care, in HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES 247, 275 (S. Jonas ed. 1977). See also THE COMPLEX PUZZLE, supra note 80, at 85-86; see
generally E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL
CARE (1974).
103. See, e.g., Evans, Supplier-InducedDemand" Some Empirical Evidence and Implications, in
THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE 162 (M. Perlman ed. 1975); Fuchs, The Stpply
of Surgeons and the Demandfor Operations, 13 Supp. J. HUMAN RESOURCES 35 (1978); Havig-
hurst, supra note 86, at 479-81.
104. See M. ROEMER, supra note 63, at 73-79; Cordes, Distribution ofhysician Manpower, in
RURAL HEALTH SERVICES: ORGANIZATION, DELIVERY, AND USE 56 (E. Hassinger & L. Whiting
eds. 1976).
105. See generally Ludlam, Physician-HospitalRelations: The Role of Staff Privileges, 35 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 879 (1970).
106. THE COMPLEX PUZZLE, supra note 80, at 87; see Canby & Gellhorn, Physician Advertis-
ing: 7he First Amendment and the Sherman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 543; Grad, The Antitrust Laws
and Professional Dircipline in Medicine, 1978 DUKE L.J. 443, 457-68.
107. See Kessel, The A.MA. and the Supply of Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 267
(1970). For an interesting historical and sociological analysis, see J. BERLANT, PROFESSION AND
MONOPOLY: A STUDY OF MEDICINE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN (1975).
108. Physician's assistants and nurse practitioners have only achieved a carefully circum-
scribed form of independence. See generally THE NEW HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (A. Bliss & E.
Cohen eds. 1977).
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services have been stymied by organized provider opposition. 0 9
Each of the factors mentioned above offers a partial explanation of
the rapid rise in hospital costs. The cumulative effect is powerful in-
deed. Given the complexity of the phenomenon, it is hardly surprising
that the proposals for governmental action have been so varied and at
times contradictory. Nor is it surprising that hospital cost inflation has
so far remained impervious to tentative regulatory initiatives.
B. Nursing Homes
1. Growth of Nursing Home Industry
While students of health care regulation have appropriately fo-
cused on the hospital, it is unfortunate that they have given so little
attention to the nursing home. Fueled by Medicare and Medicaid, the
nursing home industry has grown spectacularly since the mid-1960s. It
continues to be the most dynamic part of the burgeoning health care
sector. 1l0 Once typified by the independent "Mom and Pop" operation,
the industry is now the domain of the investor-owned proprietary
chain. With change has come increasing controversy. Sensational rev-
elations about abuses of patientsIII and finances,"I2 and bitter struggles
between health planners and nursing home entrepreneurs," 3 have be-
come staple features of the industry.
Specialized institutions to provide care for the elderly are of
109. See Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978
DUKE L.J. 304, 306-19. See also Havighurst, supra note 86, at 1204-15; Kissam, Health Mainte-
nance Organizations and the Role of Antitrust Law, 1978 DUKE L.J. 487.
110. In 1977, expenditures for nursing home care rose 16.5%. Hospitals were the second most
inflationary category in the health care industry; expenditures for hospital care increased by
14.1%. See Gibson & Fisher, supra note 4, at 7 (Table 3), 8 (Table 3). See also Butler, Assuring
the Quality of Care and Life in Nursing Homes: The Dilemma of Enforcement, this Symposium.
11. See, e.g., F. Moss & V. HALAMANDARIS, Too OLD, Too SICK, Too BAD: NURSING,
HOMES IN AMERICA 15-37, 306 n.1 (1977).
112. See, e.g., id at 73-102; M. MENDELSON, TENDER LOVING GREED (1974).
113. Nursing homes initiated four of the five constitutional challenges to state certificate of
need laws. Goodin v. Oklahoma ex rel Okla. Welfare Comm'n, 436 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Okla.
1977); Simon v. Cameron, 337 F. Supp. 1380 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Merry Heart Nursing & Convales-
cent Home, Inc. v. Dougherty, 131 N.J. Super. 412, 330 A.2d 370 (1974); Attoma v. State Dep't of
Social Welfare, 26 A.D.2d 12, 270 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1966). The only successful constitutional chal-
lenge was made by a hospital. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542,
193 S.E.2d 729 (1973).
Nursing homes have consistently had more difficulty than hospitals in winning approval for
their capital expansion projects. See studies cited in D. Cohodes, C. Cerf & J. Cromwell, A Re-
view and Analysis of the Research Literature on State Certificate of Need Programs 28 (June
1978) (draft prepared for Bureau of Health Planning and Resources Development, Health Re-
sources Administration, Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare).
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relatively recent origin." 4 The extended family traditionally provided
custodial and health care to the aged and infirm; those without family
or resources were relegated to the public almshouse."15 The Depression
vastly increased the number of elderly persons in need of assistance.
Congress responded by passing the Social Security Act of 1935.116 The
Act provided financial aid to the elderly, but excluded inmates of pub-
lic institutions."t7 The result, apparently unforeseen by those who
drafted the legislation," t8 was the dramatic and largely unregulated
growth of the proprietary nursing home sector." 9
In 1966, the infusion of funds from Medicare and Medicaid set off
a second era of explosive growth. A few indicators suggest the dimen-
sions of the phenomenon:
(1) In 1965, expenditures for nursing home care totaled $1.3 bil-
lion, or 3.3% of all health expenditures. In 1977, expenditures had
increased almost ten times to $12.6 billion, and constituted 7.8% of
all health spending.'20
(2) Nursing homes are absorbing an increasing proportion of
health care expenditures made by the elderly; in 1966 15% of the
money spent for health care by persons aged 65 and older went to
nursing homes; by 1976 the figure had jumped to 23%.
121
(3) Between 1963 and 1977, the number of nursing home beds
and residents increased two and one-half times.'
22
With the elderly population continuing to grow at a rapid rate during
114. Levey & Amidon, The Evolution of Extended Care Facilities, 16 NURSING HOMES 14
(1967).
115. Id at 16-17. See also W. THOMAS, NURSING HOMES AND PUBLIC POLICY: DRIFT AND
DECISION IN NEW YORK STATE 20-29 (1969).
116. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
117. Id § 3(a); see W. THOMAS, supra note 115, at 49.
118. See W. THOMAS, supra note 115, at 45 (interview with draftsman of New York Old Age
Security Act of 1930). Early New York legislation served as the model for the Social Security Act
of 1935. Id at 50-51.
119. See id at 57-58 (New York experience).
120. Gibson & Fisher, supra note 4, at 15 (Table 5).
121. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 1976-77, at 20-
22 (1977) (DHEW Pub. No. HRA 77-1232) (Table E) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH].
122. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, ADVANCEDATA FROM VITAL AND HEALTH
STATISTICS, AN OVERVIEW OF NURSING HOME CHARACTERISTICS: PROVISIONAL DATA FROM
THE 1977 NATIONAL NURSING HOME SURVEY 2 (Table 1) (1978) [hereinafter cited as AD-
VANCEDATA]; National Center for Health Statistics, Utilization of Institutions for the Aged and
Chronically Il, United States, April-June, 1963, 12:21 VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 14, 21




the coming decades, 23 further expansion of the industry is inevitable.
2. Variation Among Nursing Homes
Like hospitals, nursing homes exhibit considerable diversity.
Nursing homes can be distinguished by the services they provide.
Skilled nursing facilities are intended primarily for people requiring
twenty-four hour nursing services. Intermediate carefacilities offer less
intensive nursing care.
Medicare covers services received in skilled nursing facilities for a
limited period of time following a spell of illness;' 24 similarly, Medicaid
programs must cover services in skilled nursing facilities. 25 In addi-
tion, states have the option of offering Medicaid coverage for services
in intermediate care facilities; 26 approximately one-third of the states
currently do so.' 27 A declining, but still significant number of homes
are not certified by either Medicaid or Medicare. In 1977, 12.4% of
nursing home beds fell into this category.
28
The nursing home industry is dominated by proprietary institu-
tions. Of the homes represented in a survey conducted by the National
Center for Health Services in 1977, only 26% were nonprofit or public
institutions. 29 Most nursing homes are small. In 1977, 71% of all
homes had less than 100 beds. 130
Differences in Medicaid coverage and eligibility requirements'
3'
have caused interstate variations in nursing home use to be far more
significant than regional variations. In 1973, there were at least 60
nursing home residents per 1000 elderly persons in 13 states; in 8 states
there were fewer than 30.132 The state with the highest proportion of
the elderly population in nursing homes was Minnesota (8.2%); the
lowest was West Virginia (1.6%).1
33
123. COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH, POPULATION AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 97-
98 (1972).
124. See Butler, this Symposium, at text accompanying notes 18-25.
125. Id.
126. Id.




131. See Butler, this Symposium, at text accompanying notes 18-25.
132. HEALTH, supra note 121, at 336-37 (Table 134).
133. Id at 19.
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3. Reimbursement Policies
State Medicaid reimbursement policies are of critical importance
to the industry. In 1977 Medicaid paid for 51% of nursing home ex-
penditures.'34 It is estimated that between 60 and 70% of nursing home
patients have either partial or total Medicaid coverage.' 35 Since reim-
bursement policies have a direct effect on profits, capital investment
and quality of care, they have been the focus of intense lobbying efforts
by the nursing home industry.
1 36
While Medicaid fostered the growth of the industry in the 1960s by
vastly increasing effective demand, 37 its current impact is more ambiv-
alent. State governments, as primary purchasers of nursing home serv-
ices, have sometimes acted aggressively to limit cost increases by
adjusting their Medicaid reimbursement policies and eligibility re-
quirements.' 38 The contrast with hospitals is instructive. With few ex-
ceptions, third-party payors have exercised little effective control over
hospital costs.'
39
The kind of incentives that encourage overutilization of physician
and hospital services are largely absent in the nursing home industry.
The nursing home operator has little direct influence on the demand
for services.140 Most physicians are not interested in increasing nursing
home use since they characteristically relinquish responsibility for care
when the patient enters the home. 14  Allegations of financial ties be-
tween nursing homes and referring physicians are largely undocu-
mented.' 42 When compared to those who use hospital services, the
nursing home consumer is relatively more sensitive to the price of serv-
ices. Almost all of the 40% of nursing home expenditures that come
134. Gibson & Fisher, supra note 4, at 7 (Table 3). Medicare accounted for only 3% ofnursing
home expenditures in 1977. Id.
135. See B. Spitz, Nursing Homes and Prospective Reimbursement 3, 5 (Nov. 1976) (Urban
Institute Working Paper 5057-2).
136. See id at 4-7, 33-34.
137. See id at 3.
138. See W. Scanlon, A Theory of the Nursing Homes Market I (Apr. 1978) (Urban Institute
Working Paper 5057-IA). Cf. B. Spitz, supra note 135, at 18-36 (case study of struggle over Medi-
caid reimbursement rates in Michigan; emphasis on political power of the nursing home industry).
139. See McCarthy, supra note 79.
140. Of course, the state trade association can have a considerable indirect impact on demand
by negotiating a favorable reimbursement rate. See B. Spitz, supra note 135, at 4-6.
141. See W. Scanlon, supra note 138, at 6.
142. Scanlon implies that such ties are rare. See id at 6-7. Yet the hypothesis is unsupported,
It is undoubtedly true that "the vast majority of physicians probably do not have a substantial
financial interest in nursing homes." Id at 7. But this tells us nothing about the proportions of
nursing homes that have financial ties with physicians. More research is clearly needed.
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from private funds were paid directly out of patient or family re-
sources; private insurance coverage was negligible.' 43 Moreover, in
contrast with consumers of hospital services, many prospective nursing
home residents and their families are relatively more able to make in-
formed decisions about whether to seek care and where to obtain it,
and to effectuate their choices independently.'"
Because of the differences between the economics of hospital serv-
ices and those of nursing homes, it may be inappropriate to apply a
regulatory scheme designed for hospitals to institutions that respond to
very different incentives. For example, in states where there is no evi-
dence of excess capacity or overutilization of nursing homes, it may be
inappropriate to establish certificate of need controls over nursing
homes. 145 Yet in the same states, regulatory efforts may well be needed
to deal with the well-documented and practically universal problems of
financial fraud and abuse 146 and the continuing difficulties of maintain-
ing adequate quality of care.'
47
II. GOVERNMENTAL CONTROLS ON HEALTH CARE
As the health care industry has changed, so has the nature of gov-
ernment involvement. When the cost of health care started its dramatic
rise in the 1960s, both federal and state government reacted by chang-
ing their traditional "hands-off" posture and attempting to impose a
variety of regulatory controls.
At least since the 1940s, most states have maintained licensure pro-
grams requiring hospitals and other health care institutions to meet
minimum standards of quality and safety.' 48 Traditionally these stan-
dards were directed only towards the condition of the facility itself (for
example, the number of beds to a room, size and number of exits) and
rarely imposed requirements affecting staffing patterns, admission prac-
tices or services delivered.' 49 After the enactment of Medicaid and
Medicare, federal law required health facilities to be certified for par-
143. Gibson & Fisher, supra note 4, at 7 (Table 3).
144. See W. Scanlon, supra note 138, at 4-6.
145. See W. Pollak, Medicaid Cost Containment Policy: Long-Term Care Reimbursement 39
& n.32 (rev. draft Apr. 1977) (Urban Institute Working Paper 986-11); Havighurst, supra note 86,
at 1167-69.
146. See authorities cited note 112 supra.
147. See authorities cited note 111 supra.
148. See Worthingham & Silver, supra note 2, at 308. See also A. SOMEpS, supra note 2, at
118-32.
149. Worthingham & Silver, supra note 2, at 308-09.
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ticipation under conditions that were similar to, but somewhat broader
than licensure standards. 50 In recent years certification requirements
have become more rigorous,' 5 and some state licensing programs have
been reoriented to have a more direct impact on service delivery.1
5 2
There has also been an increasing governmental interest in utiliza-
tion review. Concerned about the cost of services, but also about their
quality and appropriateness, the federal government imposed limited
utilization review requirements as conditions for participation in Medi-
caid and Medicare in the late 1960s. 153 Congress mandated more elab-
orate procedures in 1972 and authorized the creation of Professional
Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) to review utilization by all
Medicaid and Medicare providers.
54
The most serious efforts to regulate the health care industry, how-
ever, have been the establishment of programs to promote or, more
recently, to require the planned distribution of health care resources.
The concept remains controversial in theory and underdeveloped in
practice.' 55 Health planners are engaged in constant rearguard
skirmishes with free market theorists and frustrating confronta-
tions156 -- r unseemly alliancesI57 -with powerful local interest
groups. No one is happy with the result. Health planning efforts ap-
pear to have had only a marginal impact on the distribution of health
150. For a description of the certification standards as well as the process of enforcement, see
Wing, Title VI and Health Facilities: Forms Without Substance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 137, 163-68
(1978).
151. See Wing & Silton, this Symposium, at note 12.
152. See Butler, this Symposium, at text accompanying note 174.
153. For a summary of utilization review requirements under both Medicaid and Medicare,
see Price, Katz & Provence, An Advocate's Guide to Utilization Review, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REv.
307, 309-313.
154. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 1155-1170, 86 Stat. 1329
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320c to 1320c-22 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979)).
For a description of the PSRO program, see Price, Katz & Provence, supra note 153, at 318-
27.
155. See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 86, at 1153-54; Noll, The Consequences of Public Utility
Regulation of Hospitals, in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CON-
TROLS ON HEALTH CARE 25 (1975); Posner, Certficates of Needfor Health Care Facilities: A Dis-
senting View, in REGULATING HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION 113 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974).
Cf. Correia, Public Certcation of Needfor Health Facilities, 65 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 260 (1975);
Grosse, The Needfor Health Planning, in REGULATING HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION 27
(C. Havighurst ed. 1974); Sheps and Madison, The MedicalPerspective, in REGIONALIZATION AND
HEALTH POLICY 15 (E. Ginzberg ed. 1977) (DHEW Pub. No. HRA 77-623) (advocating planned
distribution of health care resources).
156. See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 86, at 1148-51.
157. See, for example, the allegations in Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425
U.S. 738 (1976).
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services and little, if any, effect on health care costs.
158
The impetus behind health planning was originally local. In the
1940s voluntary planning agencies in several major cities were orga-
nized to encourage more rational development of local health facili-
ties.159 The federal government first became involved in health facility
planning in 1946 when Congress established the Hill-Burton hospital
construction program. 160 Hill-Burton was intended to remedy the criti-
cal shortage of hospital facilities that had developed during the Depres-
sion and the Second World War.16 1 Grants to states were authorized
for surveying needs and developing state plans for the construction of
hospitals and public health centers.' 62 Proposed facilities that con-
formed to federal standards and to the plan developed by the state Hill-
Burton agency were eligible for federal assistance. 63 The requirement
that a single state agency establish priorities based on "need" was a
novel feature of the program.I64
Hill-Burton was remarkably successful in stimulating hospital con-
struction and renovation, particularly in small communities in the
poorer states. 165 Yet the program's achievements highlighted its limita-
tions. The great bulk of Hill-Burton funds were channeled into hospi-
tal projects, while the need for ambulatory facilities was largely
ignored. 66 Moreover, Hill-Burton agencies could only support con-
struction that they deemed appropriate; they had no authority to curb
unneeded projects.
158. For an early review of literature on certificate of need and other health planning pro-
grams, see O'DONOGHUE, EVIDENCE ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF HEALTH CARE REGULATION 59-69
(1974). The major studies of the effects of certificate of need programs are reviewed in Blumstein
& Sloan, Health Planning andRegulation Through Certificate ofNeed. An Overview, 1978 UTAH L.
REV. 3, 23-30. For a more comprehensive review and analysis of the certificate of need literature,
see D. Cohodes, C. Cerf & J. Cromwell, supra note 113.
159. Gottlieb, A Brief History of Health Planning in the United States, in REGULATING
HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION 7, 11-12 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974).
160. Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (codified
in scattered sections of 24, 31, 33, 42, 46, 48, 49 U.S.C.). See generally J. LAVE & L. LAVE, THE
HOSPITAL CONSTRUCTION ACT. AN EVALUATION OF THE HILL-BURTON PROGRAM, 1948-1973
(1974).
161. See J. LAVE & L. LAVE, supra note 160, at 7.
162. Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-725, §§ 612-13, 60 Stat.
1040.
163. Id §§ 621-25.
164. See McCarthy, Planning for Health Care, in HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES 346, 354 (S. Jonas ed. 1977). The Hill-Burton formula for determining need, while in-
creasingly criticized as expansionist in effect, remains influential. For an excellent critique of
"demand-based" planning methods, see W. MCCLURE, supra note 71, at 70-73. See also
Bovbjerg, supra note 87, at 100-09.
165. See J. LAVE & L. LAVE, supra note 160, at 2.
166. Id at 13-14.
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While Hill-Burton established a federal presence in health facili-
ties construction, the Regional Medical Program (RMP), created in
1965,167 signalled an incipient federal interest in functional planning.
The original Administration proposal contemplated a network of new
"regional medical complexes," integrating research, education, and pa-
tient care, to combat heart disease, cancer, and stroke. After intense
AMA lobbying, the bill was watered down beyond recognition. 68
RMPs were assigned the vague and circumscribed task of establishing
"regional cooperative arrangements" among medical schools, research
institutions, and hospitals for research, training and demonstration
projects related to the "killer diseases." They were admonished to do
so "without interfering with the patterns, or the methods of financing of
patient care or professional practice, or with the administration of hos-
pitals."' 169 In practice, RMPs simply subsidized the pet projects of uni-
versity medical centers. 170 After absorbing $600 million in a decade,'
RMPs had little to show for their efforts.
172
In 1966, Congress authorized funding for the establishment of a
national network of state and local Comprehensive Health Planning
(CHP) agencies.'17  This "Partnership for Health" suffered from some
of the same defects that crippled RMP: diffuse, poorly defined objec-
tives and an explicit statutory mandate not to interfere with "existing
patterns of private professional practice of medicine."' 174 The local
planning agencies were poorly equipped either to plan or to regulate.
Their only comprehensive authority was to "review and comment" on
requests for federal funds from institutions within their area. Chroni-
cally understaffed, excessively dependent on local sources of funding,
167. Heart Disease, Cancer, and Stroke Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-239, 79 Stat. 926
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299-299i (1976)).
168. See B. EHRENREICH & J. EHRENREICH, supra note 29, at 218.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 299(d) (1976).
170. See B.*EHRENREICH & J. EHRENREICH, supra note 29, at 219-31.
171. Ostow & Brudney, Regional Medical Programs, in REGIONALIZATION AND HEALTH POL-
icy, 60, 64 (E. Ginzberg ed. 1977) (DHEW Pub. No. HRA 77-623).
172. While admitting that RMPs had few demonstrable achievements, some commentators
contend that the program's value lay in its "process." The "essential function of the successful
RMP" was "catalyzing change in the patterns of planning and of interaction of competing pro-
vider institutions, and sensitizing them to regional health imperatives." These alleged successes
were admittedly "unquantifiable," of "low visibility" and "impossible to demonstrate." Id at 65.
Another commentator identifies the accomplishment of RMPs as "facilitating cooperative health
care planning." McCarthy, supra note 164, at 359. Again, supporting documentation is singularly
weak.
173. Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-749, 80 Stat. 1180 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 243, 246, 247a (1976)).
174. Id § 2(a).
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and dominated by provider representatives, CHP agencies were ineffec-
tive in exercising even this limited power."7 5
While the federal government encouraged voluntary planning,
several states turned to direct regulation of health facilities construc-
tion. New York adopted the first certificate of need (CON) law in
1964.176 By September, 1978, CON statutes were in effect in thirty-
eight states.'
77
Certificate of need laws authorize a designated agency to regulate
the construction or expansion of institutional health facilities.1 78 State
programs vary considerably in administrative structure, and procedures
for review and appeal.'7 9 Almost all programs cover hospitals and
nursing homes; most include some other facilities such as laboratories
and outpatient clinics. Capital expenditures above a specific threshold
(typically $100,000) are subject to review. Most states delegate review
authority to their local health planning agencies, but the final decision
on approval or denial remains with the state agency designated to ad-
minister the program. In almost all states that have enacted such legis-
lation, a certificate of need is a precondition to licensure.
In 1972, Congress adopted the certificate of need concept and gave
state health planning agencies another potential source of regulatory
control. Under section 1122 of the Social Security Act, states were
given the option of establishing, by contract with HEW, a program to
175. See generally B. EHRENREICH & J. EHRENREICH, supra note 29, at 198-213; O'Connor,
Comprehensive Health Planning: Dreams and Realities, 52 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 391 (1974);
West & Stevens, Comparative Analysis of Community Health Planning: Transition from CHPs to
HSAs, I J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 173 (1976).
176. Metcalf-McCloskey Act of 1964, ch. 730, 1964 N.Y. Laws 1883 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW (McKinney 1978)). See Curran, A National Survey
andAnalysis of State Certfcate-of-Need Lawsfor Health Facilities, in REGULATING HEALTH FA-
CILITIES CONSTRUCTION 85, 88 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974).
177. Bloom & Bernstein, Report from Washington, TRUSTEE, Sept. 1978, at 11. The tremen-
dous rise in health care costs provided the impetus behind the certificate of need plan. Legisla-
tures recognized that "'unnecessary construction or modification of health care facilities increases
the cost of care and threatens the financial ability of the public to obtain necessary medical serv-
ices.'" Curran, supra note 176, at 85 (quoting Law of June 1, 1971, ch. 628, § 1, 1971 Minn. Laws
1165).
After initial opposition, the American Hospital Association (AHA) endorsed the certificate of
need concept in 1968. With AHA support, CON statutes were passed in rapid succession. Id at
87, 89. The AHA's interests in regulation are complex. Established hospitals undoubtedly see
CON as an opportunity to solidify their control over the local market and to prevent the entry of
vigorous competitors, especially proprietary hospitals and HMOs. Havighurst, supra note 86, at
1178-88. They may also hope that CON will strengthen the ability of administrators and trustees
to resist excessive demands for capital expenditures by the medical staff.
178. See generally Havighurst, supra note 86.
179. LEWIN & ASSOCIATES, NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF STATE HEALTH REGULATIONS 50-54,
166-94 (1974); Havighurst, supra note 86, at 1169-78.
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review institutional capital expenditures.1 0 Health facilities engaging
in such expenditures without the prior approval of the state's desig-
nated 1122 planning agency would receive a pro rata reduction in the
reimbursement for services rendered under Medicaid and Medicare.'
8 '
By 1978, thirty-six states had opted to participate.'82 Although this
"federal certificate of need program" has never been fully imple-
mented, it clearly indicated an increased federal interest in regulatory
strategies.'
83
In the early 1970s, a welter of federal, state and local agencies
shared the task of planning and regulating the development of health
facilities. The National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act of 1974184 was an ambitious attempt to bring order and direction to
these disjointed efforts. CHP, RMP and Hill-Burton were effectively
superseded by a single program combining planning, developmental
and regulatory functions.8 5 Certificate of need programs became inte-
gral parts of the system.
The National Health Planning Act has been reviewed in detail
elsewhere. 8 6 The most important features that bear on health facilities
regulation are noted below:
(1) The Act provides for a significantly greater role for the fed-
eral'government. The Secretary of HEW is instructed to issue national
health planning guidelines respecting the supply, distribution and or-
ganization of health resources and services. 87 State and area health
180. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 221, 86 Stat. 1329 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-1 (1976)).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-l(d) (1976).
182. See Kopit, Hospital Decertffication: Legitimate Regulation or a Taking of Private Prop.
erty?, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 179, 181 (citing DIVISION OF REGULATORY ACTIVITIES, BUREAU OF
HEALTH PLANNING AND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, DHEW, STATUS OF CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED
AND SECTION 1122 PROGRAMS IN THE STATES (1978)).
The enactment of the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976)), has made the future
of 1122 programs problematical. For a prognosis, see Hanley, Regulation ofHealth Facilities and
Services Under Public Law 93-641, in HEALTH REGULATION: CERTIFICATE OF NEED AND 1122, at
53, 58 (H. Hyman ed. 1977).
183. See Wing & Silton, this Symposium, at text accompanying note 39.
184. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976)).
185. The earlier federal planning legislation was never repealed, but after a transitional pe-
riod, no further appropriations were made to support the programs.
186. See K. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 137-42 (1976); Atkisson & Grimes,
Health Planning in the United States: An Old Idea With a New Significance, 1 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 295 (1976); Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 158, at 8-19. The authors are particularly
indebted to Blumstein & Sloan's succinct, yet comprehensive, discussion.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-3001 (1976).
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plans must be consistent with national standards.188 While participa-
tion is in theory voluntary, states that fail to adopt a planning system
meeting the Act's requirements risk losing federal assistance under a
variety of health-related programs.8 9
(2) Unlike the CHP agencies, which could merely review and
comment, the Health Systems Agencies (HSAs) created by the Act have
the power to review and approve or disapprove applications from their
area for federal funds under specified programs.'90
(3) The Act requires each state to adopt an approved certificate
of need program by 1980.191 According to federal regulations, the cer-
tificate of need law must cover "[t]he construction, development, or
other establishment of a new health care facility or health maintenance
organization."'19 2 An expenditure above $150,000 will trigger review by
the HSA,193 as will changes involving ten beds or ten percent of capac-
ity.194 General criteria for certificate of need review are established by
regulation. 95 The HSA may pursue an administrative appeal if its rec-
ommendations are not accepted by the state planning agency.
19 6
Two other provisions of the Act are of limited immediate signifi-
cance, but suggest possible directions for government intervention in
the future. First, HSAs are required to review periodically existing in-
stitutional health services and make recommendations to the state
agency regarding their "appropriateness."'' 97 There is no power, how-
ever, to eliminate services that are found to be unneeded. 98 Second,
188. Id § 3001-2(b)(2).
189. Id § 300m-(d). Failure to comply could entail loss of funding under the Public Health
Service Act, the Community Mental Health Centers Act, and the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse
and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970. The courts have held
that this use of the congressional spending power is not unduly coercive. North Carolina ex rel
Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'dmem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-2(e)(1)(A) (1976). Funds appropriated under the Public Health Service
Act, the Community Mental Health Centers Act, sections 409 and 410 of the Drug Abuse Office
and Treatment Act, and the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treat-
ment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970 are subject to HSA review.
191. Id § 300m-2(a)(4)(A).
192. 42 C.F.R. §§ 122.304(a)(1), 123.404(a)(1) (1978).
193. Id §§ 122.304(a)(2), (b)(l), 123.404(a)(2), (b)(1).
194. Id §§ 122.304(a)(3), 123.404(a)(3).
195. Id §§ 122.308, 123.409.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-l(b)(13) (1976). See also 42 C.F.R. § 123.407(a)(9) (1978).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-2(g) (1976). For a useful analysis of the legal issues surrounding appro-
priateness review, see Cole, Issues and Strategies in Appropriateness Review: A LegalAnalysis, in
PRELIMINARY APPROACHES TO APPROPRIATENESS REVIEW UNDER P.L. 93-64 1, at 89 (M. Mandel
ed. 1978). See also Weiner, Appropriateness Review and Rate Selling, in id at 39.
198. The Senate version of the bill would have granted this authority. See Kopit, supra note
182, at 182.
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the Act provides funding to support rate review experiments in six se-
lected states. 199 Only a few states have initiated rate review programs,
but federal financial support may encourage others to do so.
200
Opposition by providers may be sufficiently strong to resist further
extensions of government control. Nevertheless, it is worth noting
those regulatory proposals that are likely to be given serious
consideration.
If certificate of need programs prove to be ineffective, more drastic
measures may be adopted to limit capital expenditures. The Carter
Administration's hospital cost containment proposal20 included provi-
sions that would have established an annual capital expenditure limita-
tion of $2.5 billion. The limit would be apportioned among the states,
and no state program could grant certificates of need in excess of its
allotment.20 2
It has been proposed that certificate of need programs be supple-
mented by regulatory authority to decertify institutions when there is
existing excess capacity.20 3 In fact, the Senate version of the National
Health Planning Act would have required participating states to in-
clude decertification authority in their certificate of need program2°4;
this provision was amended, however, to become the more timid "ap-
propriateness review" authority ultimately enacted.20 5 One state has
enacted comprehensive decertification authority, although it has never
been used.206
Whether these or other, more serious measures207 will be adopted
depends in large part on whether the cost problem can be reduced to a
politically tolerable level. Carter's cost containment proposal was de-
feated under peculiar circumstances: hospital representatives made
commitments to the Congress that the industry, through its own orga-
199. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-5 (1976).
200. See Weiner, Participatory Procedure and Political Supportfor Hospital Cost Containment
Programs: Limits of Open Administrative Process, this Symposium.
201. See Wing & Silton, this Symposium, at text accompanying notes 39-57.
202. H.R. 6575, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) (Title II). See Wing & Silton, this Symposium, at
note 50.
203. Kopit, supra note 182.
204. S. 2994, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 53, re-
printed in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7842, 7892.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-2(g) (1976). See Kopit, supra note 182, at 182.
206. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 13.15 (McKinney 1978); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2806-a
(McKinney 1977); see Kopit, supra note 182, at 186.
207. A temporary moratorium on hospital construction has been proposed. B. ENSMINOER,
supra note 86, at 71-72; FUCHS, supra note 53, at 151; GOVERNMENT RESEARCH CORPORATION, A
FRAMEWORK FOR CAPITAL CONTROLS IN HEALTH CARE 3-4 (1978).
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nized "Voluntary Effort," would bring about at least a 2% annual re-
duction in hospital inflation. °s Whether this effort will be successful
and, if successful, sufficient, remains to be seen. Its success may fore-
stall further governmental regulation; its failure may provide the politi-
cal justification for more serious controls.
III. CONCLUSION
The preceding summary of the American health care delivery sys-
tem as it exists today reflects a basic and growing conflict: the con-
sumer, with growing expectations of health services frustrated by the
inflating cost of those services, is confronted with a system of health
care providers with little willingness or economic incentive to reduce
costs. Government attempts to resolve this conflict have thus far been
ineffective. Tentative regulatory initiatives, fashioned more by political
considerations than by any notion of sound, coordinated public policy,
have had little measureable success; yet this lack of success has only
increased the pressures to do "something" and created a climate in
which more drastic measures, once thought to be unnecessary or inap-
propriate, are now being considered.2 °9
At the heart of the conflict lies the problem of cost-an aggregate
total of $180 billion in 1978, predicted to exceed $200 billion by
1980.210 Health care costs consume 10% of the federal budget and as
much as 8% of the budget of some state governments. 21 ' The cost of
health care is not just one of many examples of inflation in an inflation-
ary economy; it is a significant cause of inflation in the economy in
general. A few economists argue that the seriousness of the cost prob-
lem has been overblown. The cost of health care may be 8.6% of the
GNP, but we are, apparently, tolerating that level of spending; and
there is no reason to believe that a nation as wealthy as ours cannot
spend 10% or even 15% of its resources on its health care. That may be
the price we must pay for what we want.
Such rationalizations can, however, only temporarily ease the ten-
sion. If $180 billion is an acceptable level of spending, $200 billion or
$240 billion or whatever lies ahead will not be so easily tolerated. The
problem is not just the absolute level of spending; it is the inflation and
the inflation of inflation. At some point, if the costs of health care con-
208. See Wing & Silton, this Symposium, at note 41.
209. Id at text accompanying notes 39-71.
210. See note 4 supra.
211. See note 5 supra.
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tinue to rise, the problem will grow to the point at which it cannot be
avoided or muted by marginal adjustments or by shifting the economic
impact of that cost. Cutbacks in state Medicaid budgets or closures of
public hospitals may lessen that impact on state or local government
and shift the burden to consumers; we may even go through the mo-
tions of enacting some sort of nationalized health insurance scheme,
achieving a more equitable distribution of costs at the expense of more
aggregate inflation. But simply shifting the burden from one level of
government to another, or from the consumer to the taxpayer-or vice
versa-can at best provide only temporary relief. Unless cost is con-
trolled, the conflict has to escalate to a confrontation. We are not sim-
ply making an allocation of resources; we are trying to achieve both
economy and efficiency. We want at least the level of services we now
receive, but we no longer are satisfied with the resulting cost. Thus, we
are increasingly willing to mandate government intervention into the
decisionmaking of health care providers. Today, political considera-
tions may have forestalled cost containment, decertification or even the
procompetition strategies preferred by the free market theorists, but we
have not avoided the problem. We may at the moment prefer "Volun-
tary Effort" to an increase of government control, but unless the prob-
lem of cost can be resolved, the political reality of tomorrow may be
quite different.
The likely response is predictable: incremental increases in regu-
latory controls and more serious efforts under existing programs. Yet it
is possible that this too will be unsuccessful. The regulatory strategy
may be unworkable in practice, or it may be theoretically unsound. No
amount of coercion, regulation, or financial incentives may be sufficient
to reorient the existing system of ostensibly private providers in a direc-
tion acceptable to the public. At that point, a major restructuring may
be the only alternative. This could be in the form of the more elaborate
systemic revisions suggested by Havighurst and others-literally creat-
ing more competition by creating more competitors-or it could mean
public ownership of health care resources, either in the form of a na-
tionalized health service or by creation of a publicly owned alternative
competitor. Already we have reached the point at which such previ-
ously heretical alternatives can be seriously discussed.
But these are the alternatives of last resort and the choices of cir-
cumstances that have not yet materialized. Rather, in the short run, we
are likely to take a series of incremental steps towards increased gov-
ernment control, a more serious testing of the regulatory strategy, but
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not a major departure from the basic structure of our system. Our fo-
cus, therefore, can be appropriately directed toward existing regulatory
efforts and the lessons they demonstrate for both the near and distant
future.

